Welcome to the last edition of What about Ukraine?, the newsletter that helps you keep updated about what has been said recently about Ukraine in Ukraine, and in the international media. After two years and seventy editions, our project, as part of the Europe-Ukraine desk, finishes here for now. However, we hope that this is just a pause and not a goodbye.

This week’s Ukrainian article is an opinion column by journalist and columnist Vitaly Portnikov, who reflects on the huge changes in international politics experienced in the last few weeks. Using General Charles de Gaulle’s political positions as a means of orientation, Portnikov highlights the unreliable assumption that leaders of the US and its European allies will share the same values and goals forever. The big question now is how will Europe act if the US breaks Euro-Atlantic solidarity. No one has left instructions for such a scenario, except for de Gaulle.

This situation seemed unbelievable when we started to write this newsletter. In almost every European country, from Bulgaria to Spain, the political debate on rearmament is heated. Germany has approved a historic change to rules on its country’s debt, to allow the spending of billions on defence. Public opinions are deeply polarised and citizens’ support for sending weapons to Ukraine has decreased in almost all EU countries, except for France and Germany. Meanwhile, Russian disinformation, in countries such as Italy or France, is still strong.

Three years after the full-scale Russian invasion, media coverage on Ukraine has decreased. For example, in Spain only two of the major newspapers have permanent correspondents on the field. Hungarian pro-governative media continues to be the most pro-Russian in the EU, and among the population the percentage of those who hold Ukraine responsible for the conflict has even increased. 

However, Europe is trying to imagine a new scenario. The rearmament plan is also seen as an opportunity to boost the continent’s economy. In Italy, for example, there is talk about the possibility of converting troubled car factories into centres for drone and weapon production.

Lidia Baratta
Editor of this week's edition

Many Ukrainians feel betrayed by the new American leadership. Actions such as a pause in intelligence sharing between Washington and Kyiv, and renewed diplomatic relations between the US and Russia, as well as Russian-friendly statements from the White House are making the people lose trust in a state previously considered a key partner in a defensive war. During one of the most recent opinion polls, held among Ukrainians in March, only 13 percent of respondents said they considered the US is a friendly state. This is a huge drop. In another survey held in December 2024, 40 percent of Ukrainians said they trusted the US, while 23 percent said they did not.

With a dramatic change in US foreign policy, the EU is seen as Ukraine’s main remaining partner. As of December last year, 90 percent of Ukrainians declared their strong will for their state to become a member of the EU, while 84 percent wanted to see Ukraine as part of NATO. But what if the North Atlantic Alliance is about to transform as well? In an opinion column translated by n-ost this week, Ukrainian journalist Vitaliy Portnikov reflects on the changing world order. He highlights an unreliable assumption that leaders of the US and its European partners will share the same values and goals forever. And he takes inspiration from a French war hero and president, general de Gaulle, whose vision on geopolitics, he suggests, proves to be farsighted. 

"Now that we live through one of the most critical moments in history, I wonder: how could one not consider that our civilization could develop in a different way? How could anyone be so overconfident to believe that the model that emerged after World War II would last forever? The past often becomes the present. So, why did we not plan for a scenario for when America leaves Europe? That the United States might again become a distant land over the ocean, as it was before World War II? Almost no one has anticipated that. Except for de Gaulle. But unlike his contemporaries, the General did not just anticipate such a situation, but acted on his belief."

This column was originally published by Zbruc, an online-media focused on opinion columns and culture, history and foreign policy. 

Translated by Olesia Storozhuk.

Bulgaria

Reporting on the war highlights cultural divide

Reporting on the war in Ukraine has meant presenting the tragic events that followed the Russian full-invasion in February 2022, but also dealing with the deep divisions that run through Bulgarian society. The media in Bulgaria has shown diverse and polarised perspectives in its coverage of the war, reflecting the country's complex historical and cultural ties to Russia, and using both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian narratives. The country remains split, although the traditional sympathy towards Russia appears to be significantly diminishing as the conflict drags on. (Svobodna Evropa)

In April 2023, a report on the media in southeast Europe (CSD) highlighted Bulgaria as a country sensitive to "[some] mainstream news websites [that] are endemic source of pro-Kremlin disinformation" and other types of propaganda, and that the "Kremlin’s informational influence has penetrated deep into the mainstream digital media landscape". Structural polarisation over Ukraine, according to a 2024 study (Reuters Institute) has also made a significant contribution to the ongoing decline in public trust in the media in Bulgaria. Despite these issues and a lack of money, the Bulgarian media have consistently informed their readers and viewers about the developments and dynamics of the war in Ukraine. 

Over the last three years, the media has followed some war-related topics closely, such as the important and little-known Bulgarian contribution to the supply of weapons to Ukraine (24Chasa), the living conditions of the large Bulgarian minority, concentrated in the Bolhrad region of the Odesa oblast, the economic relations between the two countries, including fears of competition in the agricultural sector (Kapital), and the ongoing saga of the sale to Kyiv of two Russian-made nuclear reactors (bTV). An important moment of solidarity and closeness with Ukraine came in August 2024, when the annual meeting of Bulgarian media (BTA), based both in Bulgaria and abroad, was held in Odesa.

France

Media battles disinformation from high-level influence

The war in Ukraine initially sparked an unprecedented surge in French media coverage, with nearly one in five topics focusing on Ukraine in the first weeks. However French outlets did not establish permanent bureaus in Kyiv, unlike the German media, and have relied instead on freelancers and short-term correspondents. Still, Ukraine's proximity to France and its positive democratic status has resonated with the French public, according to researcher Arnaud Mercier. A March 2025 survey shows that 64 percent of French people do not want to decrease military support for Ukraine.

Media coverage has decreased since the first months of the war in 2022. For instance, by 2023, coverage was reduced by nearly four times in evening news broadcasts, almost three times in morning radio shows, and by half on news channels (INA). Other wars, like the Israel-Hamas conflict, have diverted the media attention (Le Monde). The French media market's economic and trust crises, coupled with an increased reliance on social media, have also influenced coverage. Russia regularly manipulates social media to spread disinformation. Additionally, French conservative billionaire Vincent Bolloré, who has acquired many media outlets, has promoted a pro-Russian narrative through his outlets since Trump's 2025 inauguration (see previous newsletter). 

Opposition political parties, like Marine Le Pen's far-right RN and Mélenchon's far-left LFI often employ a similar rhetoric on Ukraine. The RN supports Ukraine's right to defend itself, but opposes direct military involvement and certain forms of aid that could 'escalate the conflict'. LFI opposes military aid, advocating for immediate negotiations and criticising Ukraine's path towards NATO and EU membership. But the main divide in French public opinion is over sending troops to Ukraine. Many oppose direct military engagement, fearing it could lead to war at home. Surveys show that 68 percent of French people are against sending combat troops if the war continues, but 67 percent support sending troops to ensure peace if a peace agreement is signed. (BFMTV)

Germany 

Political scientist: "Deterring Russia can only succeed if Europe is prepared to pay for it"

Germany’s shift in policy towards Ukraine began with chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende (‘turning point’) speech in February 2022, signalling a new direction in foreign policy. Since then, Germany has emerged as one of Ukraine's strongest allies, providing nearly 44 billion euros in aid by February 2025. Media coverage has reflected this shift, with many outlets sending journalists to Ukraine. Die Zeit appointed a Ukraine correspondent, and, in October 2023, ARD opened a studio in Kyiv. Major German media have strongly criticised Russia’s aggression while urging more military support and diplomatic efforts. At the same time, chancellor Scholz has faced harsh criticism in the media, especially regarding his erratic response to the war. (bpb)

In recent months, Germany's early parliamentary elections kept Ukraine in the political spotlight. The CDU/CSU (Centre-right), the SPD (Social Democrats) and the Greens (Centre-left, environmentalist) with 28.5 per cent, 16.4 per cent and 11.6 per cent respectively, all support Ukraine, and advocate for continued military aid. Meanwhile, the right-wing AfD (Alternative for Germany), with 20.8, and the Left Party (Die Linke), with 8.8 per cent, oppose further military aid (tagesschau). Public opinion remains largely supportive of Ukraine, with 67 per cent in favour of military assistance, though regional differences persist. East Germans are more sceptical of arms supplies and sanctions compared to those in the West. (ZDF)

Last week, the Bundestag approved a historic change to the country’s debt borrowing rules, clearing the way for billions in defence and infrastructure spending. This included 11 billion euros in military aid to Ukraine, with three billion to be allocated in 2025 and the remaining eight billion by 2029 (tagesschau). As the war continues, concerns about a potential Russian attack on Germany have grown. Carlo Masala, professor at the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich, recently published the book 'When Russia Wins' (C.H. Beck, 2025) and has been a frequent guest at talk shows. He argues: "Deterring and containing Russia can only succeed if European societies are prepared to pay the price for it". (Sueddeutsche)

Hungary

Anti-Ukraine sentiment fuelled by pro-Government media

Hungary is in the most controversial position in the European Union regarding Russia's war against Ukraine. The government, describing itself as "pro-peace", has consistently opposed any armed assistance to Ukraine, as this only "prolongs" the conflict, and blames the West for the continuation of the war. During the 2024 European Union election campaign, German chancellor Olaf Scholz and Manfred Weber, president of the European People's Party, were called the "butchers of Europe" in a video on Hungarian state television. (M1) 

Budapest has threatened to veto EU decisions in support of Ukraine for three years. While it did not veto the extension of EU sanctions against Russia in 2025, it recently blocked the opening of the first chapters of EU-accession negotiations with Ukraine. The government is organising a survey on the issue (Telex English), stressing that Ukraine's accession would impose a heavy financial burden on the EU. However, a comment piece asks whether this "veto diplomacy" is in the interests of Hungary, which is in an ongoing stand-off with the EU over frozen EU funds (Válaszonline). The relationship between prime minister Viktor Orbán and Russian president Vladimir Putin also has been the subject of much criticism and analysis in the media. (Telex English)   

After US President Donald Trump came to power, the tone towards Ukraine has become increasingly harsh in the pro-government media, which was already permissive towards Russia and strongly anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western. For example, a pro-government commentator recently called the 2022 Bucha massacre a "false flag" operation, implying that it was not committed by the Russians. It may also be the result of years of such rhetoric that polls show a stronger anti-western sentiment in Hungary than in other countries of the region (Szabad Európa), and since 2022, the percentage of those who hold Ukraine responsible for the conflict has increased. (Index)

Italy

Politics caught between support for Trump, the EU and coalition partners

​​In Italy, the media coverage of Ukraine has decreased and changed over the past three years. The number of war correspondents on the ground has dropped, and fatigue is present, but attention remains high, with analyses and in-depth reports that allow audiences to learn about Ukrainian culture, customs and traditions. The two governments in power from February 2022 have both supported Kyiv, but in Italy the influence of Russian propaganda has remained strong in media and politics. 

The arrival of Donald Trump at the White House changed the game for the government led by the rightwinger Giorgia Meloni. Ukraine has become a topic of political conflict within the governing majority and opposition parties, who are split over the issue of rearmament. According to several polls, half the Italians are opposed to sending weapons to Ukraine, and only one in three supports increasing military spending (Ipsos). Responding to such views, Meloni is struggling to build a strong position between European allies, Trump, and the government ally Matteo Salvini, leader of the League party, who opposes unconditional support for Ukraine (La Stampa). Even within the Democratic Party, the main opposition party, there are strong divisions on peace and rearmament (Linkiesta)

A possible end to the war and the EU’s rearmament plan are seen as opportunities for the Italian economy. In the business sections of the newspapers, there is talk about the possibility of converting struggling car factories into production centres for weapons and drones (Open). This coming July, Rome will host the ‘Ukraine Recovery Conference’. The Italian and Ukrainian governments have already signed memoranda of understanding on raw materials, energy restoration, cultural preservation, and industrial and railway reconstruction (Today). As surveys show, Italians hope the end of the war will put an end to the economic uncertainties of recent years. (Corriere)

Spain

Leaders fear domestic politics more than Putin

Spain supports Ukraine, but the war feels distant to many people. As a result, the media often struggles to determine how and what to tell the audience. Of the ten major Spanish newspapers, only two have permanent correspondents in Ukraine. The remainder rely on special envoys dispatched a few times a year, or freelancers. Television coverage reflects a worst trend. After maintaining full-time teams on the ground in the early stages of the war, no Spanish TV channel currently has a consistent presence in the country.

What do Spaniards think of the war? 65 per cent believe Europe should back Ukraine until either the 1991 or 2022 borders are restored (El Confidencial). At the same time, 69 percent believe the war is weakening the EU’s economy, an issue that remains at the heart of domestic political debate (Cuatro). Spain’s social democratic government has prioritised green energy and social spending, but rising electricity prices and Europe’s shift towards rearmament may force a rethink, which raises concerns among voters. These tensions are compounded by the country’s fragile political landscape: the government coalition relies on the support of four additional parties to secure an absolute majority. Among them are both left and right wing separatists with starkly opposing views on NATO, the EU and Russia. (El Español)

Another hot issue is the possible return of compulsory military service, which 42 percent of Spaniards support, with huge differences among regions (El País). Russian propaganda has seized on the topic, targeting both left and right with claims that young Spaniards will be sent to die in trenches in Kharkiv, Warsaw or Riga. Regardless of public opinion, Spain has pledged ten billion euros in aid to Ukraine over the next decade, but blocked the 40 billion euros EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas planned for 2025 (ABC). For Madrid’s leaders, domestic politics still inspire more fear than Vladimir Putin.

Since October 2023, the Europe-Ukraine Desk has been curating this newsletter, delivering 70 editions to over 620 subscribers from professional journalistic communities with a steady open rate of 50-60 percent.

For now, this is the last edition of What About Ukraine. We are working to secure funding to continue bringing you a weekly selection of insightful journalism and keeping you updated on how Ukraine is discussed across Europe. If you have ideas on how to support us, please reach out to about.ua@n-ost.org! And if you have enjoyed our content, please help spread the word.

This week’s edition was put together by our team across Europe: Lidia Baratta, Kornelia Kiss, Clara Marchaud, Oksana Mamchenkova, Francesco Martino, Antonina Rybka, and Fermin Torrano. Michael Bird was our proofreader.

We say goodbye for now and hope to be back soon.