The beginning of Russia’s full-scale war completely changed the structure of Ukraine’s television landscape. On 24 February 2022, the six biggest channels, including those privately-owned and state owned, and the public broadcaster, united to create a telethon 'Yedyni novyny', providing viewers with updates on the development of the war.
Two-and-a-half years later, this telethon attracts more critics and scepticism than trust among both audiences and media professionals. According to one of the recent polls, 47 percent of Ukrainians do not trust the updates, compared to the 36 percent who do. According to another piece of research into public opinion, TV remains an important source of information for 43 percent of respondents, but this figure has dropped. In 2022, almost 67 percent of Ukrainians stated that they received information from TV news.
Over two years, from March 2022 to March 2024, the state issued a total of 27 million euros of cash to TV companies, supporting the production of the content for 'Yedyni novyny'. Channels receiving this money include four private stations, which were previously considered a tool for oligarchs to influence the informational and political agenda. Even more so, the owners (or previous owners on paper) of two Ukraine’s biggest media groups are currently under arrest and sanctions in different corruption cases.
In a piece, translated by n-ost this week, journalist Natalia Dankova gives a detailed overview of the current situation within Ukraine’s private television networks. She answers tricky questions about how the war and public financing has changed the character of the most popular channels. And, what is even more important, who influences their editorial policies in wartime and what comes next. Media expert Otar Dovzhenko tells Dankova in the article:
"This spring, Yaroslav Yurchyshy, head of the Verkhovna Rada’s (Ukraine parliament) committee on the freedom of speech, offered his vision (in an interview for RBC-Ukraine): 'De-facto, the state resorted to such a mild type of de-oligarchisation, where we offer the funding, and the channels, on their part, guarantee compliance with certain editorial standards, so that we do not have some new, say, [Russian pro-Putin propagandists] Solovyov or Simonyan on air.' However, the situation where the state takes over an enterprise, starts publicly funding its operation and defining the principles of said operation (which in our case entails editorial policies and the media’s participation in the telethon), has a different name, which is 'nationalisation'. At the same time, the state doesn’t assume legal ownership [of media groups], it just acts as such in all but name. Basically, those media were confiscated for the needs of the state. No wonder, then, that those media are immune to sanctions."
This piece was originally published by Detector Media, a Ukrainian independent online publication focused on the analysis of the country's media landscape and informational policy.
Translated by Tetiana Evloeva. |